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This expert guidance document was developed as a resource to
provide healthcare epidemiologists working in acute-care
hospitals with a high-level overview of incident management
for infectious diseases outbreaks and to prepare them to
work within an emergency response framework. It addresses
how the epidemiologist’s skills and expertise apply to scenarios
that require enhanced preparedness and response efforts,
eg, when pathogens associated with outbreaks are poorly
characterized or when outbreaks require additional interventions including, but not limited to, healthcare personnel education, enhanced infection prevention and control measures,
added stafﬁng, supplies, and resources, adjustments to clinical
and support activities, and external communications. Its
recommendations are not pathogen-speciﬁc and are meant
to apply to a range of potential infectious diseases outbreaks.
To provide high-level guidance and context for incident
management, the authors specify recommendations for the
healthcare epidemiologist, as well as involvement and
responsibilities of the facility and other healthcare
personnel (HCP).

In May 2016, SHEA members submitted online applications
for the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America
(SHEA)/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
Outbreak Response Training Program (ORTP) panels, which
were responsible for the content development for the multifaceted educational, training, and guidance opportunities
provided by the ORTP: Advisory Panel, Expert Guidance
Panel, and Education Panel. Panel members were selected
based on their expertise in outbreak response, professional
background, and involvement with SHEA and other organizations working in outbreak response and relevant ﬁelds. Each
panel was composed of multidisciplinary experts in public
health, emergency medicine, hospital medicine, community
medicine, microbiology, pediatrics, and long-term care, with
additional expertise in infectious diseases including Ebola virus
disease (EVD), pandemic inﬂuenza, carbapenem-resistant
Enterobacteriaceae (CRE), multidrug-resistant tuberculosis
(MDR-TB), Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus
(MERS-CoV), severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), and
Zika virus.

Afﬁliations: 1. University of Connecticut School of Medicine, Farmington, Connecticut; 2. Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, Canada; 3. Children’s Mercy
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The SHEA/CDC ORTP Expert Guidance Writing Panel
(ie, the authors) were selected based on additional expertise in
guidance and guideline-writing, and are the primary authors of
this document. Advisory Panel members, the overseeing body
for the entire ORTP, contributed to this guidance by conducting a needs assessment to determine knowledge gaps and
identify effective strategies for outbreak response and incident
management, and by reviewing, analyzing, and summarizing
resources identiﬁed by the CDC for the Expert Guidance Panel
to consider for inclusion in the expert guidance document, and
by reviewing and providing comments on drafts and the ﬁnal
version of the expert guidance document (see the Methods
section).

background
The 6 major factors identiﬁed by the Institute of Medicine
(IOM) in 1992 as contributing to infectious disease emergence
and reemergence—advances in technology, increases in
volume and speed of international travel and commerce,
microbial adaptation and change, and the breakdown of public
health capacity at the local, state, national, and global levels—
have intensiﬁed over time.1 Emerging pathogen outbreaks in
the United States and abroad can occur with little forewarning,
disrupting hospital operations, limiting capacity to provide
services to patients, and possibly compromising the safety of
healthcare personnel (HCP). This expert guidance document
(EG) was developed as a resource to provide healthcare epidemiologists (HEs) with a high-level overview of incident
management for infectious diseases outbreaks, and includes
references to help with operationalizing its recommendations.
While outbreak management is a major area of responsibility for HEs,2 many do not have formal education in incident
management or preparation to work within an emergency
response framework. This document addresses how HE skills
and expertise apply to scenarios that require enhanced preparedness and response efforts, eg, when pathogens associated
with outbreaks are characterized poorly (source, means of
transmission, and/or disease outcome) or when outbreaks
require additional interventions including, but not limited to,
healthcare personnel (HCP) education; enhanced infection
prevention and control measures; added stafﬁng, supplies, and
resources; adjustments to clinical and support activities; and
external communications.

intended use
This document is intended for US HEs working in acute-care
hospitals. Its principles may be applicable to other types of
facilities, eg, free-standing emergency departments, urgent
care centers, long-term care, and nontraditional acute-care
settings; however, the primary goal of this document is to
provide guidance and resources focused on the acute-care
hospital setting. Its recommendations are not pathogenspeciﬁc and are meant to apply to a range of potential infectious diseases outbreaks.

To provide high-level guidance and context for incident
management, the authors specify recommendations for the
HE, as well as involvement and responsibilities of the facility
and other HCP. In this guidance document, the term “facility,”
when used in the recommendations, refers to facility leaders’
assignments of responsibilities to appropriate individuals or
groups. Roles that these individuals take may vary depending
on the facility.
SHEA develops special topic EGs for areas that lack the
level of evidence required for a formal guideline developed
using the Grading of Recommendations Assessment, Development and Evaluation (GRADE) or a similar systematic
methodology; they are important in provision of safe, effective
health care. Expert guidance documents are based on synthesis
of available evidence, theoretical rationale, current practices,
practical considerations, writing group opinion, and consideration of potential harm where applicable. As such, evidence level is not provided for individual recommendations.3
Although regulations are referenced throughout the document, this guidance document should not be used in a
regulatory capacity.
No EG can anticipate all situations and this guidance
document is not meant to be a substitute for individual judgment by qualiﬁed professionals.

methods
Needs Assessment
The Advisory Panel conducted a needs assessment to determine knowledge gaps and identify effective strategies for outbreak response and incident management. The assessment
survey was sent to US SHEA Research Network Members
(SRN) via an online survey (Appendix 1: Needs Assessment for
Results and Discussion), and the results were used to prioritize
topics for the EG.
Document Development
The authors followed the process outlined in the “Handbook
for SHEA-Sponsored Guidelines and Expert Guidance Documents.”3 The writing panel wrote PICO-style (ie, population,
intervention, control, and outcome) questions to set the scope
of the document. These questions were used in the development of search terms, and both the questions and search terms
were voted on by the writing panel until unanimous approval
was achieved (see the online supplemental Literature Review
Table).
Resources for this document were drawn from 2 separate
review processes. The CDC provided a list of resources that
included government resources, hospital policies and guidance, standards and regulations, and articles published in
peer-reviewed literature. Advisory Panel members reviewed
each resource from the perspective of the HE to identify
terminology, frameworks, partners/stakeholders, and skill
development opportunities, as well as to evaluate its relevance
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for use in facility and/or emerging pathogen outbreaks and
provided the reviews to the authors to consider for inclusion in
the expert guidance document (EG). When deemed appropriate by the authors, additional resources evaluated for relevance and quality were added (see the online supplemental
Literature Review Table).
The authors conducted a separate review of literature published from January 1, 1990, to October 1, 2016. Only English
language articles with abstracts were included in the review. A
primary reviewer and secondary reviewer assessed the articles
generated from the searches for potential inclusion in the
document (see the online supplemental Literature Review
Table).
The EG synthesizes the CDC-provided resources and literature review ﬁndings to provide practical guidance and
useful references to the HE for incident management of
infectious diseases outbreaks. SHEA expert guidance documents apply a formalized process for obtaining expert consensus. Recommendations are listed with rationale statements
that consider relevant evidence as well as the consensus of the
group. Consensus is determined via an anonymous voting and
comment period.3
Review, Clearance, and Endorsement
The following organizations provided reviews and comments:
American Association of Critical-Care Nurses (AACN),
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), the
Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC), the CDC, the SHEA Guidelines Committee,
the SHEA Publications Committee, and the SHEA Board of
Trustees.
The EG was approved for publication by the ORTP Advisory
Panel, the SHEA Guidelines Committee, the SHEA Publications Committee, and the SHEA Board of Trustees. It also
received CDC clearance.
The following organizations endorse the guidance: SHEA,
the American Association of Critical-Care Nurses (AACN), the
American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), the
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE), HCA
Healthcare, the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA),
The Joint Commission, the National Association of County
and City Health Ofﬁcials (NACCHO), and the Pediatric
Infectious Diseases Society (PIDS).

guidance statement
Incident Management
The term “incident management” describes the activities an
organization takes to prepare for, respond to, and learn from
an event or hazard, including service interruptions (eg, telecommunication), local events (eg, municipal ﬂood or ﬁre),
and larger events (eg, mass casualty or international epidemic).
This section provides an overview of incident management for
infectious diseases outbreaks and the federal, state/territorial/
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regional, and facility-based structures that drive those activities. While the HE does not have responsibility for many of the
actions recommended in this section, they provide the HE with
relevant context and background into facility incident
management.
This section’s recommendations reference incident management terminology that may be unfamiliar to the reader
(Table 1). They are explained further in the rationale sections
where they appear.

Incident Management Organizational Structures
Recommendations.
1. A facility should use an Emergency Management Program
(EMP) to identify its goals and vision related to emergency
management and to guide it through the incident management phases of preparedness, mitigation, response, and
recovery from a crisis.
2. The facility should use an all-hazards self-assessment to
inform the EMP and determine how it can fulﬁll its core
mission of patient care during incidents, including infectious diseases outbreaks.
3. Within the EMP, the facility should create an emergency
operations plan (EOP) that includes 6 critical components,
as required by The Joint Commission’s Emergency
Management Standards:
a. Communications
b. Resources and assets
c. Safety and security
d. Staff responsibilities
e. Utilities
f. Clinical support activities
4. The facility should assess the adequacy of the EOP by
conducting drills, competency assessments, and simulation
exercises.
5. The facility should coordinate and communicate outbreak
response through the Hospital Incident Command System
(HICS).
Rationale. Figure 1 illustrates how the following federal to
facility-level incident management structures are organized.
The National Incident Management System (NIMS), overseen by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
provides a common standard for collaboration between
federal, state, tribal and local governments, and nongovernmental organizations during crises. The NIMS facilitates
communication,4,5 provides a uniform approach to procedures, protocols, and expectations,6,7 and guides integration
of diverse entities that, if necessary, can establish uniﬁed
command by combining incident command structures.5
The NIMS components for incident management have been
summarized as follows4,5:
1. Preparedness
2. Communications and information management
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Terminology

Term(s)
All-hazards preparedness
CDC Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
Common operating procedure,
common operating picture
Department of Health
Department of Health and Human Services
Ebola virus disease
Emergency department
Emergency management program
Emergency Medical Services
Emergency operations plan
Emergency support function
Expert guidance document (SHEA)
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Hazard vulnerability analysis, risk assessment
Healthcare personnel
Healthcare epidemiologist
Hospital incident command system
Hospital incident management team
Hospital command center
Healthcare coalition
Hospital preparedness program
Incident command system
Uniﬁed command
Incident commander
Infectious disease
Infection preventionist
Job action sheet
Laboratory response network
Liaison ofﬁcer
Long-term care facility
Medical screening examination
Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus
Multidrug-resistant organism
National Disaster Medical System
National Incident Management System
National response framework
Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness
and Response
Ofﬁce of Public Health Preparedness and
Response, CDC
Person under investigation
Personal air purifying respirators
Personal protective equipment
Public information ofﬁcer
Reusable medical equipment
Safety ofﬁcer
Severe acute respiratory syndrome

3. Resource management
4. Command and management
5. Ongoing management and maintenance

Acronym(s) and
Similar Term(s)
Needs assessment
CERC
CDC
CMS
COP
DOH
HHS
EVD
ED
EMP
EMS
EOP
ESF
EG
FEMA
HVA
HCP
HE
HICS
HIMT
HCC
HPP
ICS
UC
IC
ID
IP
JAS
LRN
LO
LTCF
MSE
MERS-CoV
MDRO
NDMS
NIMS
NRF
ASPR
PHPR
PUI
PAPR
PPE
PIO
RME
SO
SARS

The NIMS provides the template for incident management,
and the US National Response Framework (NRF) describes
the structures by which the federal government responds to
crises. Together, NIMS and NRF integrate incident management capabilities from the federal to local level. The NRF is
comprised of 20 emergency support functions (ESFs), which
create a structure for federal interagency response to states.8
From the federal to facility levels, a common operating picture
(COP) ensures consistency in incident information, decision
making, and status updates.
The federal government supports state and local authorities
when resources are limited or overwhelmed. The Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR)’s Hospital
Preparedness Program (HPP) focuses on preparedness strategies for situations when healthcare capacity is stretched. Under
the HPP are Health Care Coalitions (HCCs), which are comprised of healthcare organizations (eg, hospitals, EMS, public
health) within a geographic area.9 The HCCs integrate with
Emergency Support Function (ESF)-8 (Public Health and
Medical) activities and incident command system (ICS)
responsibilities. In addition, each state develops guidance for
crisis standards of care (CSC) with input from local and
regional authorities.10 State public health will enact CSC
operations emergency declarations to protect the public and
healthcare personnel (HCP) in situations when resources are
impacted or limited.10
The ICS under the Command and Management
component of NIMS provides the basis for HICS and creates
a management system that provides a coordinated institutional response to any emergency, including an infectious
disease outbreak within a facility.11 When activated for
an outbreak, HICS is meant to optimally leverage available
resources, allow personnel to organize in a manner that
allows them to achieve a desired outcome, and prevent
discord and confusion when operating under stressful conditions.12 Both NIMS and HICS involve common terminology, a
speciﬁc chain of command, management sections, and emergency response roles. There are 5 major sections within the
HICS6,7:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Command
Operations
Planning
Logistics
Administration/Finance

The HICS structure facilitates rapid integration of multifaceted response elements within a facility, allowing each
group (eg, infection prevention and control, public affairs,
supply chain management) to work within its area of expertise
while accessing the information and operational capabilities
of other groups in an efﬁcient and organized manner.
Because most organizations with responsibilities in incident
management employ an incident command system (ICS),
HICS facilitates communication with external groups and
agencies.5,13
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ﬁgure 1. Diagram of incident management preparedness structures and frameworks. This diagram was created by the authors of this
expert guidance document to illustrate how US preparedness structures and frameworks relate, starting at the federal level and moving to the
facility level. Legend: National Incident Management System (NIMS), National Response Framework (NRF), Emergency Support Function
(ESF), Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP), Health Care Coalition (HCC), Crisis Standards of Care (CSC), Hospital Incident Command
System (HICS), Emergency Management Program (EMP), Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).

During HICS activation, the hospital may need to activate
different response elements within the structure, depending on
the nature of the event and the operational needs of the facility.
The effectiveness of HICS relies on the familiarity of staff in
working within the structure, provided through training,
routine exercises, and activation for incidents that require a
rapid and multifaceted institutional response.13–15
HICS is managed by the Hospital Incident Management
Team (HIMT) (Figure 2), whose responsibilities are deﬁned
with job action sheets (JASs) that can be amended to ﬁt a
scenario. The facility identiﬁes an appropriate physical space
for the HIMT to meet during HICS activations, called the
hospital command center (HCC).6
A facility’s Emergency Management Program (EMP) sets
the goals and vision for handling crises, builds on the 4 phases
of incident management, and informs HICS6,16:
1. Preparedness: Planning the actions needed in the case of an
emergency or threat.

2. Mitigation: Prevention of an emergency or efforts to reduce
the damage from a hazard.
3. Response: The activities that occur during an emergency.
4. Recovery: The actions needed following an emergency to
return to normal.
The EMP is informed by a Hazard Vulnerability Analysis
(HVA) (also known as a risk assessment), which highlights
potential hazards, their likelihood and impact, and the
vulnerabilities a facility may have in the setting of such a
hazard, and an All-Hazards Self-Assessment of the facility’s
operational needs to fulﬁll its core mission of patient care
during an incident, regardless of the nature of the incident.16,17
The EMP is overseen by an Emergency Program Manager
and Emergency Management Committee, which create the
Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) that details a facility’s plan
for responding to and recovering from threats and helps
organize the structure of the hospital response, including the
execution of HICS during an incident.12 The EOP is comprised
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Hospital incident management team (HIMT). From the HICS guidebook6,7 (p. 45):
∙ Incident commander (IC): Oversees operation; determines which parts of the plan will be activated.
∙ Public information ofﬁcer (PIO): Provides information updates to internal and external stakeholders.
∙ Liaison ofﬁcer (LO): Conduit between hospital and outside agencies.
∙ Safety ofﬁcer (SO): Responsible for safety of hospital staff, visitors, and patients; monitors response and anticipates hazardous
conditions or situations.
∙ Medical-technical specialist (likely role of the HE): Assists the incident commander by providing event-speciﬁc advice and counsel.
∙ Operations section chief: Develops and implements strategies and tactics carried out by the incident commander, i.e., staging,
medical care, infrastructure, security, hazardous materials, and business continuity.
∙ Planning section chief: Oversees incident related data gathering and analysis and develops alternatives for tactical operations and
preparing the incident action plan for each operational period.
∙ Logistics section chief: Obtains necessary resources needed by operations and planning; supervises damage reporting and control,
sanitation, supply, transport, and nutrition.
∙ Finance/Administration section chief: Monitors cost related to the incident; accounting, procurement, and analyses.

of 6 critical components, as required by the Joint Commission’s Emergency Management Standards18:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Communications
Resources and assets
Safety and security
Staff responsibilities
Utilities
Clinical and support activities

Rather than creating a different plan for every possible extraordinary event, the basic response elements that are common
to most potential incidents form the backbone of preparedness
within the EOP. In addition, the EOP includes several other
elements:
1. Plans that address different categories of incidents (eg,
emerging pathogens, radiation events, chemical events,
mass casualty events). Within the category of biologic
events, such as inﬂuenza pandemics or outbreaks of
emerging pathogens, the EOP leverages commonalities
between microorganisms (eg, mode of transmission,
laboratory risk, waste management needs).17
2. Protocols for coordinating with external entities
3. Personnel training
4. EOP implementation plan9
5. Review and evaluation of the EOP

Federal and state guidance documents and tools are
available to help facilities create and assess the adequacy of
their EOPs,19 and outline operational aspects of response,
including activation of the EOP, stafﬁng considerations,
communication needs, infection prevention and control, and
postmortem care.17
Stakeholders in Preparedness and Response
Recommendations.
1. The healthcare epidemiologist (HE) should create, maintain, and/or have access to a list with contact information
for individuals and groups/organizations relevant to his/her
role in outbreak response, and establish lines of communication with these stakeholders.
2. The HE should be familiar with facility, local, and state
practices and protocols for interaction with stakeholders,
which may vary depending on location.
Rationale. Successful incident management requires the
expertise of numerous internal and external stakeholders
(Table 2), with coordination from facility leadership and
adherence to communication protocols.20–23 For the purposes
of this document, the authors deﬁne internal stakeholders as
parties within the facility that can affect or be affected by
the outbreak. Internal stakeholders vary depending on the
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Stakeholders and Resources in Incident Managementa

Internal
Patients
(no contact list)

Direct care HCP
(no contact list)
Clinical leadership

Administrative leadership

Support services leadership

Facility services leadership

∙ Patients
∙ Patients’ families
∙ Visitors
∙ Community
∙ Physicians
∙ Nurses
∙ Allied health practitioners
∙ Medical and nursing
○ Critical care
○ Infectious diseases
○ Obstetrics
○ Medicine
○ Pediatrics
○ Radiology
○ Surgery
○ Trauma
∙ Allied health (OT/PT/RT)
∙ Emergency department leads
∙ Community infectious diseases physicians who would act as medical-technical specialists in HIMT
∙ Volunteer services (facility and emergency response)
∙ Facility
○ President/Chief executive ofﬁcer
○ Director of nursing
○ Chief medical ofﬁcer
○ Chief safety ofﬁcer
○ Risk manager
○ Vice president of ﬁnance
○ Communications
∙ Health incident management team (HIMT)
○ Incident commander (IC)
○ Public information ofﬁcer (PIO)
○ Liaison ofﬁcer (LO)
○ Safety ofﬁcer (SO)
○ Medical-technical specialist
○ Operations section chief
○ Planning section chief
○ Logistics section chief
○ Finance/Administration section chief
○ Recovery coordinators
∙ Academics, if applicable
○ Dean of students
○ Student health medical director
∙ Infection prevention and control
∙ Environmental services
∙ Food services
∙ Information technology and health information systems
∙ Security
∙ Materials management
∙ Ethics
∙ Laboratory operations
○ Microbiology
○ Blood bank
○ Other laboratory divisions as appropriate
∙ Dialysis
∙ Diagnostic imaging
∙ Occupational health and safety
∙ Ambulance services
∙ Pharmacy
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Continued

External
Public health/departments of health ∙ Health care coalition (HCC): Healthcare organizations and public health ofﬁcials within a geographic area, conducts
preparedness and surge capacity exercises, collaborates with Emergency Support Function (ESF)-8.
∙ State/Territorial/Regional/Tribal
○ Contacts at the local health department. These contacts can assist with contacting the state laboratory contacts or the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
○ State epidemiologists
○ Director of health and nursing leadership
○ Public health laboratory leadership
∙ Federal
○ Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
■ CDC
∙ Laboratory response network (LRN): Integrated network of state/local public health, federal, military, and
international laboratories created to respond to bioterrorism, chemical terrorism, and other public health
emergencies.
∙ 24/7 Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Watch Desk
■ National Institutes of Health (NIH)
○ Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP): Federally funded
program to support regional healthcare system preparedness9
○ Emergency support functions
■ ESF-8 (Public health and medical services)
■ ESF-1 (Transportation)
■ ESF-3 (Public works and engineering)
■ ESF-5 (Emergency management)
Regional healthcare organizations/
∙ Health care coalition (HCC)
facilities
∙ Hospitals
∙ Postacute-care facilities
∙ Long-term-care facilities
∙ Healthcare networks
∙ Designated specialty care centers
∙ Healthcare providers
∙ Clinical care centers
Municipality leadership
∙ Mayor
∙ Emergency medical services
∙ Fire and rescue
∙ Law enforcement
∙ Public works
Unions
Relevant union(s) based on facility
Nongovernmental organization
∙ Volunteer/donation supported organizations (eg, Red Cross, Salvation Army)
(NGO) contacts
∙ Faith-based organization(s)
Public and media
Coordinated through public information ofﬁcer (PIO)
(no contact list)
Resources and Assets

Examples

Facility

∙ Floor plans
∙ Generators
∙ Heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems
∙ Power
∙ Sanitation
∙ Ventilation
∙ Water
∙ Beds
∙ Extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO) equipment
∙ Hemodialysis equipment
∙ Ventilators
∙ Personal protection equipment (PPE)
○ Type
○ Quantity on site
○ Quantity stockpiled
∙ Reusable medical equipment (RME)
∙ Alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR) stations

Equipment

Medical supplies

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 28 Jan 2022 at 14:43:12, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.

shea guidance and resources for outbreak response

table 2.

1401

Continued

Resources and Assets

Examples

Pharmaceuticals

∙ Antimicrobials
∙ Vaccines
∙ Immune globulin
∙ Rapid diagnostics
∙ Treatment
∙ Technology that may not be ordinarily available
∙ Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA)/ CDC Outbreak Response Training Program (ORTP)
○ Digital toolkits on preparedness, mitigation, response, recovery, implementation
○ In-person conference recordings
○ Communication strategies webinar recordings
○ Online simulation modules
∙ Council for Outbreak Response: Healthcare-Associated Infections and Antimicrobial-Resistant Pathogens (CORHA)
∙ ASPR
○ Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) Performance Measures and Implementation Guide9
○ Technical Resources, Assistance Center, and Information Exchange (TRACIE)38
○ Public Health and Information Sharing Toolkit55
∙ National Ebola Training and Network Center (NETEC)
∙ CDC
○ Preparedness and Emergency Response Learning Centers (PERLC)
○ Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) training31
○ Pathogen-speciﬁc tool kits23
○ Outbreak investigation tool kit69
○ Prevention tool kits and transfer forms80
∙ San Francisco Bay Area Advanced Practice Center Infectious Disease Emergency Response (APC IDER)49

Private or academic research centers

Training, education, and toolkits

a
Hospital epidemiologists should obtain contact information for individuals or groups whose information is available and can be maintained.
Individual contacts may change, so permanent ofﬁce lines should be included. While each stakeholder and resource may not be needed in every
outbreak, all should be identiﬁed during preparedness.24, 44 Additional stakeholders and resources may be needed and/or available depending on
the facility.
Patients, visitors, and direct care personnel, while stakeholders, are too numerous and frequently changing to be maintained by the HE for the
purposes of an incident management contact list.

situation (eg, speciﬁc pathogen, mode of transmission, number
of patients involved, severity of illness, geographic distribution
of cases). The authors deﬁne external stakeholders as organizations, agencies, groups, and individuals external to the facility
whose engagement may be required for effective outbreak
response.
Internal stakeholders in incident management, in addition
to patients, visitors, and volunteers, can be broadly divided
into several categories (Table 2)24:
1. Direct care providers (eg, physicians, nurses, allied health
practitioners)
2. Administration (eg, hospital executive, risk management,
communications, ﬁnancial leadership)
3. Support services (eg, environmental services, food services,
security)
4. Facility services (eg, laboratory, diagnostic imaging, occupational health)
An organizational chart for outbreak response, eg, the CDC
Hospital Pandemic Inﬂuenza Planning Checklist, may assist in
deﬁning stakeholder roles and responsibilities.24,25 The composition of the team of internal stakeholders may vary
depending on the type and scale of the outbreak and the speciﬁc pathogen. Responsibilities should be deﬁned in relevant

policies and procedures and reﬂect members’ content expertise, as well as role in planning, implementation, and response.
An emerging pathogen outbreak usually requires resources
and expertise beyond the facility’s internal stakeholders, in part
because of the rapidly evolving nature of the outbreak, the
likelihood that multiple jurisdictions will be affected, and the
speed and consistency needed for guidance and policy development and implementation. External stakeholders include
health authorities at the state/territorial/regional level,
including HCCs, and federal levels, who may lead coordination across public and private sectors (Table 2).10,26–28
Depending on the pathogen, the breadth of stakeholders may
expand or contract. In the case of pathogens resulting in
imported US cases with the potential for local and sustained
human-to-human transmission (eg, SARS, MERS-CoV,
EVD), the response may include involvement of the US
National Response Framework (NRF)’s Emergency Support
Functions (ESFs) for interagency response to states, including
Emergency Support Function (ESF)-8 (Public Health and
Medical Services), ESF-1 (Transportation), ESF-3 (Public
Works and Engineering), ESF-5 (Emergency Management),
and/or others. Activating state and/or federal ESFs require
state emergency management or FEMA. State and local
emergency management should be contacted if a facility
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determines ESFs are needed. State emergency management
would serve as the conduit for FEMA if federal ESFs are
needed.
Communication Strategies
Recommendations.
1. Facilities should employ communication standards
described in NIMS, which recommends common or plain
language used across systems (emergency management, law
enforcement, emergency medical services, ﬁre department,
and public health agencies).
2. Facilities should adhere to the 6 principles of CDC’s Crisis
and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC).
3. The HE should be trained in CERC, which can be
accomplished through in-person and online training.
Rationale. In public health emergencies, including emerging
pathogen outbreaks, effective communication to stakeholders
and the community at large requires use of common language.
NIMS provides core concepts, principles, terminology, and
organizational processes for both internal and external communications regardless of the cause, size, location, or complexity
of the situation.5 Internal communications make staff situationally aware by conﬁrming the nature of the threat, what is
currently known about the threat, and the resources committed.
Communications with external audiences provide updates and
direction for the audience.29,30 In most cases, external communication is handled by a public information ofﬁcer (PIO) in
HICS to maintain consistency of message and centralized
knowledge of information and resources shared or requested.6
The facility should anticipate and plan for follow-up questions
on background, implications of the outbreak, and speculations.4
The CDC’s CERC combines elements of crisis communication
(informing or alerting the community of an emerging pathogen)
and risk communication (providing the community with
information about the expected type and magnitude of an outcome), giving a set of principles that teach effective communication before, during, and after an emergency.31 CERC also
addresses how to communicate effectively in situations of evolving guidance and ﬁndings, and addresses the imperfect nature
of choices made during a crisis.31 The principles of CERC have
been deﬁned as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Be ﬁrst
Be right
Be credible
Express empathy
Promote action
Show respect

outbreaks, which may change or be updated due to
anticipated, occurring, or past outbreaks. Requirements
should be identiﬁed in the facility’s EMP, which should
incorporate these 2 elements:
a. Public health structures that inﬂuence delivery of care
during an outbreak investigation and/or declared
public health emergency.
b. Regulations that inﬂuence delivery of care around
facility and emerging pathogen outbreaks, as well as
declared public health emergencies.
2. The facility should ensure hospital legal counsel (or
equivalent) is part of the HICS structure.
3. The facility’s Ethics Committee (or equivalent) should be
involved in EMP and EOP reviews, especially when plans
deviate from accepted standards of clinical care.
4. The facility should be aware of its state’s “crisis standards of
care” (CSC) guidance when outbreaks limit the resources
needed to provide the usual standard of care.
Rationale. The ﬁrst line of contact in the response to an
outbreak is the state/territorial/regional public health authority. A
number of laws and regulations exist at each level relating to
outbreak investigation and incident management in a public
health emergency. Public health events (eg, 2003 SARS epidemic,
2009 inﬂuenza A (H1N1) pandemic, and 2013–2014 EVD
epidemic) led public health ofﬁcials to strengthen their
jurisdictions’ legal preparedness for all types of public health
emergencies.32,33 Speciﬁc to federal authorities, a compilation can
be found in the CDC publication “Selected Federal Legal
Authorities Pertinent to Public Health Emergencies.”34
These laws overlap with important ethical principles central
to the care of patients in public health emergencies. Speciﬁc to
EVD, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
published the “Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act
(EMTALA) Requirements and Implications Related to EVD,”
which states that every hospital must provide appropriate
screening, treatment, and isolation as needed for all individuals
who come to the emergency department (ED), including those
suspected of having been exposed to EVD, regardless of whether they arrive by ambulance or are walk-in patients.35 CMS
does allow for local authorities with responsibility for multiple
hospitals to designate Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
response to speciﬁc hospitals when EVD is considered
possible.
In November 2016, CMS published its “Emergency Preparedness Requirements for Medicare and Medicaid Participating Providers and Suppliers.”36 In November 2017, these
regulations will apply to 17 Medicare and Medicaid providers
types with requirements under 4 core elements of emergency
preparedness37:

Legal, Ethical, and Regulatory Requirements
Recommendations.
1. Federal, accrediting, state, and local/regional bodies set
requirements/standards pertinent to infectious diseases

1.
2.
3.
4.

Risk assessment and emergency planning
Communication plan
Policies and procedures
Training and testing
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Numerous checklists summarize requirements for HCP
under this rule.37,38
Using EVD as an example of an emerging pathogen outbreak response, CMS provides requirements of clinical care to
be provided through the EMTALA, also supported by Joint
Commission’s Standards to guide how to manage a person
under investigation (PUI).35,39 Facilities are required to provide the following:
a.
b.
c.
d.

Medical screening examination (MSE)
Risk assessment
Triage
Care using effective personal protective equipment (PPE)

The Joint Commission amended and revised its requirements related to emergencies to bring those regulations into
line with the NIMS/HICS framework. The requirements
include (1) identifying a leader to oversee emergency management, (2) seeking staff input when evaluating exercises and
responses to events, and (3) involving senior leadership.4,39
The facility’s Ethics Committee (or equivalent) should provide early consultation, particularly in situations when standards of care may be altered based on the pathogen. In addition,
the facility should understand and be able to access resources
relevant to its state’s CSC, based on the 2009 Institute of
Medicine (IOM) guidance for situations that cause substantial
changes in operations and the ability for the facility to provide
established levels of care. Crisis standards of care provide an
ethical framework for stewardship of limited resources.38,40
Roles and Responsibilities of the Healthcare Epidemiologist
in Facility and Emerging Pathogen Outbreaks
For the purposes of this document, the authors consider a
facility outbreak to be a situation in which the number of cases
of infection exceeds the facility’s normal baseline and intrafacility transmission is suspected or proven. Even a single case
may be considered an outbreak if normally there are no cases
(eg, healthcare-associated legionella infection). The authors
use the 1992 IOM report deﬁnition of an emerging pathogen
as a new, reemerging, or drug-resistant infection with an
incidence in humans that has increased within the past
20 years or threatens to increase in the near future.1
This section addresses the role of the HE, as well as roles and
responsibilities of the facility and direct care HCP, to provide
context regarding the division of labor and team responsibilities during incident management and outbreak response.
1. Leadership Role of the HE in Incident Management

1403

3. The HE should ensure that liability coverage is provided for
the duties undertaken based on his/her role in HICS.

Rationale. Under HICS, in most facilities the HE operates
within the command staff as the medical/technical specialist
within the HIMT (Figure 2), offering scientiﬁc advice to the
incident commander (IC) and safety ofﬁcer, assisting the section chiefs and liaison ofﬁcer (LO) with identifying risk mitigation and response options, and providing input to the public
information ofﬁcer (PIO) on communications.6,7 In smaller
cluster investigations, when HICS has not been activated or
in situations where the HE has additional training or expertise
in incident management, he/she may assume other roles,
including that of the IC.
The HE should have a working knowledge of HICS to provide
expertise and oversee the infection prevention and control components of the EOP. FEMA provides training opportunities for
HCP with a direct role in emergency preparedness, incident
management, and/or emergency response.15 The facility should
deﬁne the HE’s role during planning for facility and emerging
pathogen outbreaks within job action sheets (JAS).13 This role
may involve several elements25:
1. Providing advice and direction to the facility leadership and
the multidisciplinary team managing the outbreak.
2. Drafting clinical guidance in directing the response to a
facility outbreak.
3. Providing input into clinical operations.
4. Evaluating management options for addressing clinical
issues.
5. Reviewing messages that will be provided to the public for
accuracy and clarity.
6. Reviewing communications to the professional medical
community to ensure accuracy and acceptance by participating responders.
7. Alerting the facility’s emergency management leadership
regarding the need and timing for HICS activation in
response to an infectious diseases outbreak.
During facility and emerging pathogen outbreaks, while HEs
may provide clinical care to individual patients, they should not
be required to do so unless dictated by the clinical schedule, and
should be relieved of clinical duties if possible.2 The HE may not
be covered under the facility’s risk management structure or liability insurance, and he/she should ensure that coverage is provided by the facility for roles undertaken during outbreak
response and incident management.12,41

Recommendations.
1. The HE should be versed and trained in basic HICS
response.
2. In most facilities, the HE serves as the medical-technical
specialist in domains relevant to infection prevention and
control and infectious diseases within HICS when the
system is being utilized.

Activities and Responsibilities of the HE in Incident
Management
Recommendations.
1. The HE should provide input into the facility’s EMP and
the 4 phases of incident management as they relate to
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infectious diseases and infection prevention and control:
preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Table 3).
The HE should be involved in the development, maintenance, and evaluation of a facility’s EOP as it relates to
infectious diseases outbreaks.
The HE should ensure that the hospital systematically
monitors local, federal, and international public health
advisories and alerts of emerging pathogens.
The HE should ensure the existence of, or help develop
when needed, a hospital-wide surveillance program that
accurately and rapidly identiﬁes exposed and infected
patients and HCP, including protocols for reporting these
individuals to infection prevention and control staff.
The HE should interpret advisories/alerts and surveillance
data to identify when the healthcare facility is faced with a
potential or actual outbreak, and report this information to
the Emergency Program Manager, the Incident Commander (IC), and/or appropriate leadership as established by
the facility.
The HE should have access to contact information for, and
have working knowledge of, stakeholders’ roles in responding to a facility or emerging pathogen outbreak (Table 2).
The HE should ensure that the facility develops easily
accessible and widely disseminated written multidisciplinary protocols for identifying, investigating, responding to,
and containing facility and emerging pathogen outbreaks.
When HICS is activated, the HE should provide the
Incident Commander (IC) with situational awareness to
contribute to the common operating picture (COP) of the
crisis.

Rationale. Many resources describe the speciﬁcs of how to
manage patients with a variety of infectious diseases, including
the infection prevention and control elements; however,
knowledge of guidelines and guidance are insufﬁcient to prepare
the HE for the complexities of managing a facility-level or
emerging pathogen outbreak. To optimize the facility’s ability to
manage an infectious disease outbreak, the HE should work
with the EMP, Emergency Management Committee, relevant
planning committees (eg, regional emergency preparedness
committees), emergency department staff, and public health
departments to assess how to adapt the EMP to respond to
infectious disease emergencies. The HE should be involved in
the development, maintenance, and evaluation of the facility’s
EOP as it relates to infectious diseases and should provide input
into modiﬁcations needed to address speciﬁc infectious diseases.
Resources from CDC and The Joint Commission provide
guidance on core components of the EOP and tools to assess
plans.17,39,42 Speciﬁcally, the HE may provide input to the
EMP and EOP in the following areas42–45:
1. Surveillance to detect and report infectious diseases
threats.17
2. Policies and procedures including, but not limited to,
screening and triage, patient placement, cohorting,

3.
4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

transport, patient care, environmental decontamination,
and postmortem care.
Triage of patients, HCP, visitors, and volunteers.46
Hospital readiness related to infection prevention, such as
availability of isolation rooms, PPE, and hand hygiene
products and stations.
Patient populations that may be disproportionately
impacted (eg, children, immunocompromised patients,
pregnant women).
Education for HCP, including physicians, direct care
HCP, indirect care HCP, students, and volunteers.
Occupational health policies and procedures including
but not limited to nonpunitive sick leave and postexposure prophylaxis.
Surge capacity
Protocols for speciﬁc pathogens46
Communication protocols, to include coordination and
communication with local, state, and federal agencies.5,31
Information management
Laboratory issues
Immunoprophylaxis, chemoprophylaxis, and antiinfective treatment
Physical plant, including but not limited to waste
management
Exercises/drills to test and update the EOP

Role of the HE in Coordination with Stakeholders
Recommendations.
1. When HICS is activated, the HE should assist the IC and
the PIO in creating and/or reviewing messaging for
internal and external stakeholders. If HICS is not activated,
the HE will assist designated facility communications
leadership.
2. The HE should work collaboratively with internal and
external stakeholders to coordinate the outbreak response
in accordance with his/her designated role within HIMT
(Table 2).
Rationale. As part of preparedness, the HE should identify
internal and external stakeholders before an incident occurs, to
include communications personnel/PIO, senior leadership of
the facility (eg, President/Chief Executive Ofﬁcer, Director of
Nursing, Chief Medical Ofﬁcer, Chief Information Ofﬁcer),
the local health department, and other community contacts
(Table 2). External stakeholders may include local, state/territorial/regional, and federal health departments, reference
laboratories, and local hospitals. The Hospital Pandemic
Inﬂuenza Planning Checklist assists in identifying potential
contacts.4,44
The HE should inform staff via established protocols of the
status of an outbreak response. When HICS is activated, the
HIMT liaison ofﬁcer will be responsible for updates to and
correspondence with stakeholders.11 The response and
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Activities of the Hospital Epidemiologist in Incident Managementa

Phase
HE Role in EMP and EOP
Preparedness: Planning actions needed in the case
of an emergency or threat

Mitigation: Prevention of an emergency or efforts to
reduce the damage from a hazard

Response: Activities that occur during an emergency

Example Activitiesb
∙ Identify strengths and/or gaps as they relate to infectious diseases outbreaks
∙ Bring forward for speciﬁc consideration and training ﬁndings of infection prevention and control
assessments that show potential vulnerabilities or weaknesses, eg, hand hygiene compliance or
environmental cleaning
∙ Identify and/or establish protocols within the facility’s EOP as they relate to outbreak or emerging
pathogen management:
○ Policies for speciﬁc pathogens
○ Environmental decontamination
○ Environmental safety
○ Respiratory etiquette
○ Evaluation, diagnosis, and management of patients, including screening, triage, placement,
transport, care
○ Surveillance and triage of HCP, volunteers, patients, and visitors
○ Patient populations that may be disproportionately impacted by a threat (eg, children,
immunocompromised patients)
○ Transfer policies (eg, LTCF or specialized facility)
○ Postmortem care
○ Information security
∙ Identify and establish points of contact, stakeholders, and resources (Table 2)
∙ Provide input into infection prevention and control education and training for HCP, including direct
patient care HCP, clinical staff, laboratory staff, housekeeping, emergency personnel, and
environmental services, especially in measures such as hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and
isolation
∙ Provide input into exercises/drills to test EOP
∙ Provide input regarding resource and stafﬁng needs, including the potential for enhanced supports for
laboratory, housekeeping, and environmental services.
∙ Provide input into occupational health considerations, including nonpunitive sick leave, furlough,
quarantine, and postexposure prophylaxis so that the facility can maintain:
○ Rapid identiﬁcation of potentially exposed patients/staff/visitors and create line list of those
individuals
○ Notiﬁcation of exposed individuals, with proper documentation
○ PEP for exposed individuals
○ Tracking of HCP work
○ Approval of communications by appropriate individuals (eg, PIO, Risk Management)
∙ Ensure adequate surveillance and detection for infectious diseases threats (eg, syndromic surveillance,
monitoring national and global epidemics)
∙ Plan how patients with a suspected or conﬁrmed infection would be isolated or cohorted
∙ Evaluate and recommend alternative management strategies based on the suspected mode of
transmission
∙ Work with staff/HIMT to ensure adequate supplies of PPE (respiratory protection, eye protection,
impervious body coverings, gloves), isolation rooms, and hand hygiene stations and products, and
PPE stockpile
∙ Work with staff/HIMT in design and/or implementation of HCP training on PPE use
∙ Manage HCP exposures
∙ Input into quantity needed for disposable and nondisposable supplies and equipment and adequate
numbers of RME
∙ Provide guidance in cleaning and disinfection of RME and the environment
∙ Input into strategy for continuing activities in the setting of limited supply quantities
∙ Fill role of medical-technical specialist in HIMT (most likely role of the HE), providing expert medicaltechnical content
∙ Identify/draft clinical guidance pertaining to pathogen, eg, screening/triage protocols, care protocols,
isolation
∙ Adjust clinical and support activities depending on mode of transmission
∙ Monitor the incident for infection prevention and control implications
∙ For HCP, patient, and visitor post-exposure management:
○ Identify and line-list all potentially exposed HCP/patients/visitors
○ Work within structure to notify all exposed individuals
○ Determine whether post-exposure prophylaxis is available and indicated
○ Determine whether exposed individuals need to be furloughed or quarantined
○ Supervise tracking and documentation of all post-exposure management activities, including
exposure notiﬁcation
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Continued

Phase

Recovery: Actions needed following an emergency to
return to normal

Regulations and Legal Considerations for the HE
Preparedness

Mitigation
Response
Recovery
Resource Management
Preparedness
Mitigation

Response
Recovery

december 2017, vol. 38, no. 12

Example Activitiesb
∙ Provide input into physical plant/waste management
∙ Provide input into post-mortem placement or storage if needed
∙ Collaborate with communications staff/PIO:
1. Ensure effective communication with local and regional public health departments
2. Draft and/or review internal and external messages
3. Serve as media spokesperson on issues pertaining to the pathogen
∙ Be familiar with the facility’s recovery plan and the HE’s role:
○ Cleanup
○ Garbage and waste disposal
○ Re-supplying inventory and resources, eg, PPE; return of outside resources as they pertain to
infection prevention and control
○ Equipment repair
○ Physical repair and restoration
○ Follow-up on HCP exposures
○ Employee assistance program
○ Incident debrieﬁng, ie, review PPE, training, and exposures
○ After-action report
○ Process for formally acknowledging assistance received
∙ Identify infection prevention and control risks and vulnerabilities that may impede recovery
○ HCP fatigue and illness
○ Outbreak fatigue
∙ Contribute to recovery phase needs assessment:
○ Short and long-term healthcare systems recovery priorities
○ Immediate operating needs for delivery of essential services
∙ Revise procedures and policies based on corrective actions required during the response phase10,17
∙ Provide input into when the organization may shut down HICS and return to normal operations
∙ Collaborate with communications staff/PIO in:
○ Developing messages for HCP and the public explaining the reasons for demobilization and the
recovery phase and processes
○ Serving as media spokesperson on issues pertaining to the pathogen
○ Communicating infection prevention and control recovery phase issues to local and state/
territorial/regional agencies as indicated
∙ Local public health laws (state/territorial/regional speciﬁc)
∙ CMS regulations related to speciﬁc pathogens35
∙ Joint Commission management of a PUI
Ensure liability coverage for duties undertaken in role of medical-technical specialist in HICS
Seek consultation with internal risk management, ethics specialists, and local and national public health
authorities as needed
Input into how laws and regulations affected the response
∙ Develop strategies for dealing with limited/constrained resources and/or surge capacity
∙ Review “State Crisis Standards of Care”
∙ Input into inventory supplies at the facility
∙ Input into items needed from regional stockpile inventory, if necessary
∙ Work with staff to ensure adequate supplies of PPE (respiratory protection, eye protection, impervious
body coverings, gloves), isolation rooms, and hand hygiene stations and products
Adapt airﬂow for surge capacity
∙ Contribute to recovery phase needs assessment:
○ Identiﬁcation of facility’s short and long-term recovery priorities
○ Identiﬁcation of immediate operating needs for delivery of essential services:
■ Personnel
■ Equipment
■ Supplies
∙ Along with the facility recovery team, coordinate with internal and external stakeholders such as other
hospitals in the network, local and state health departments, and nongovernmental stakeholders (eg,
home care services, LTCF, Red Cross, etc.) to develop collaborative strategies for delivery of essential
health services
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Continued

Phase
Clinical Research Related to the HEc
Preparedness

Mitigation
Response

Recovery

Example Activitiesb
∙ Identify local investigators
∙ Identify key personnel to assist with IRB or IND process
∙ Participate in webinars discussing research on emerging infectious diseases
Identifying experimental vaccines or therapeutics for patients cared for within the HE’s institution
Participating in clinical research within the institution, including administration of experimental
vaccines or therapeutics, obtaining clinical samples, and conducting chart reviews as part of approved
studies
∙ Publishing ﬁndings of event evaluations as appropriate
○ After-action report
○ Corrective action plans

NOTE: HE, hospital epidemiologist; EMP, emergency management program; EOP, emergency operations plan; HCP, healthcare personnel;
LTCF, long-term-care facility; PEP, postexposure prophylaxis; PIO, public information ofﬁcer; HIMT, hospital incident management team;
PPE, personal protection equipment; RME, reusable medical equipment; CMS, Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services; PUI, person under
investigation; HICS, hospital incident command system.
a
Activities may vary based on facility structure and needs. Many of these responsibilities may be shared or assigned to other facility or incident

notiﬁcation footprint may differ depending on the outbreak,
eg, MRSA cluster in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU)
contained within the facility, versus a norovirus outbreak with
nursing home exposure that may require intervention and
detection by the local health department, versus a measles or
SARS cluster that would require state or federal involvement
after the local public health department was notiﬁed.
In emerging pathogen outbreaks, the facility must ensure
timely sharing of information and efﬁcient responses both
internally and externally.6 As the subject matter expert informing
the HIMT, the HE may also serve as an external point-person for
local, regional, and federal public health authorities.27,47

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) ASPR
TRACIE provides technical resources and assistance in emergency preparedness, including emergencies caused by emerging pathogens.38
In the EOP, the facility should identify regional specialty care
centers for management of care, coordination of transport, and
conservation of supplies and resources to streamline safe and
effective care (Table 2). Additionally, the facility may have
access to regional collaboratives and/or healthcare networks
that can be utilized for standardization of policies and procedures and self-designation of centers for specialized services.10
Some organizations have developed toolkits to assist with
accessing needed resources during an outbreak response.49

Additional Resources and Assets for Outbreak Response
Recommendations.
1. In coordination with the facility, the HE should know how
to access and use the following resources for additional
assistance:
a. The facility’s HVA/risk assessment for most likely
threats, to identify gaps
b. Ofﬁce of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and
Response (ASPR) Technical Resources, Assistance
Center, and Information Exchange (TRACIE)
c. Internal and external stakeholders (see Table 2)
2. The HE should have knowledge of the following resources:
a. Regional centers with specialized capabilities for managing patients with suspected or conﬁrmed infection
with the pathogen of interest
b. Principles and processes related to transfer of care and
coordination for EMS transport
Rationale. In the event of an infectious diseases outbreak,
facilities may require additional resources, which should be
identiﬁed through the facility’s HVA/risk assessment and
incorporated into preparedness efforts.25,48 The US

Clinical and Support Activities
Recommendations.
1. The HE should ensure that a facility’s policies and
procedures address, encourage, and facilitate infection
prevention and control measures, including but not limited
to hand hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and transmissionbased precautions.
2. The HE should be familiar with facility resources identiﬁed
in the EMP, including
a. Number of isolation rooms and their locations
b. Plans and capability to adapt patient care rooms or
units’ airﬂow for surge capacity.
c. Cleaning and decontamination processes for both the
environment and medical equipment.
d. PPE and medical supplies
3. In collaboration with the facility’s Ethics Committee (or
equivalent), the HE should provide expertise to leadership,
or the IC when HICS is activated, in determining whether
clinical care practices warrant modiﬁcation or avoidance,
depending on how the pathogen is transmitted, and
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whether additional measures or resources are needed to
protect patients and HCP.
4. The HE should provide input to ensure that the facility:
a. Uses syndromic surveillance to detect an emerging
pathogen outbreak in collaboration with and based on
guidance from public health authorities.
b. Is prepared to provide a medical screening examination
(MSE) of patients in clinical areas.
c. Provides critical care with appropriate PPE.
d. Places PUIs in private rooms as soon as possible until
transfer to an appropriate isolation room, which may
be in another center that has specialized capabilities,
if needed.
e. Has appropriate environmental controls available,
including rooms that meet airborne infection isolation
speciﬁcations when airborne transmission may be a
potential mode of transmission.
Rationale. At all times, a facility’s policies and procedures
should address, encourage, and facilitate infection prevention
and control measures, including but not limited to hand
hygiene, respiratory etiquette, and transmission based precautions.50 Healthcare organizations should have a hierarchy
of controls to provide a safe workplace:
1. Engineering (eg, airborne isolation rooms, hand hygiene
stations)
2. Administrative (eg, policies and procedures, including
ﬁtness to work)
3. The HE should collaborate with facility leadership/IC and
provide guidance in the 4 phases of incident management
as they relate to clinical and support activities, and
infrastructure of the facility.33 The HE may be involved in
recommending alternative management strategies and/or
reallocation of resources:
1. Training of clinical, laboratory, housekeeping, and
environmental services staff in infection prevention
and control procedures pertinent to speciﬁc pathogens.
2. Providing protocols for use of equipment. When
appropriate, disposable items should be used in caring
for infected patients and PUIs. Items that are nondisposable should be dedicated for use only on the
infected patient.51
3. Reviewing support activities for enhancement or adjustment based on the pathogen of concern and suspected
mode of transmission, including but not limited to
laboratory specimen handling and diagnostic testing,
cleaning and decontamination processes, and waste
management.
4. Assessing resource allocation to support outbreak
management activities, including but not limited to
laboratory, housekeeping, and/or environmental services, as dictated by the speciﬁc situation.
5. Reorganization, reassignment, or retraining of clinical
and support staff.

6. Investigating and providing risk assessment for speciﬁc
clinical activities if there is concern that a pharmaceutical, procedure, or medical device is causally linked to
pathogen transmission.
7. Limiting number of staff caring for infected patients
(eg, nurses, nursing assistants).23 Staff members who are
ill should be excluded from work and non-essential staff,
students, and volunteers may need to be excluded from
areas in which infection transmission may be
occurring.22
8. Temporary closure of an area of the facility.22,52
9. Utilization of information technology (IT) to provide
electronic health records (EHR) alerts/ﬂags for exposed
people in their incubation period and screening or
treatment algorithms within the EHR for triage.
The HE should be familiar with a facility’s EMP, including
clinical, core support, and infrastructure for the facility.
Clinical services and infrastructure include, but are not limited
to the following10,45:
1. Clinical examinations: The facility should have syndromic
surveillance in place to detect an emerging pathogen
outbreak in collaboration with and guidance from public
health authorities50 and be prepared to provide medical
screening examination (MSE) for patients suspicious of
infection with an emerging pathogen or highly transmissible infectious disease.
2. Respiratory therapy
3. Radiology
4. Trauma
5. Critical care
6. Pediatrics
7. Labor and delivery
8. Medication administration
9. Isolation capacity: PUIs should be placed in private rooms
and facilities should provide critical clinical care with
appropriate environmental controls and necessary PPE
until transfer to centers with specialized capabilities.35,53,54
Core support services include the following:
1. Blood bank
2. Communications
3. Decontamination: Proper specimen handling (cleaning,
disinfection, or sterilization) and environmental infection
prevention and control procedures are important to
prevent transmission of pathogens.42 For emerging
pathogens, special facility arrangements may be needed
for waste disposal, including linens and supplies, and
processing efﬂuents for speciﬁc pathogens.45
4. Human resources
5. Information systems: Leadership responsible for information technology and information management should
minimize risks for data breaches that may compromise
patient and staff conﬁdentiality, which include the
following:
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6.

7.
8.

9.
10.

a. Coordinating and limiting communication and data to
the minimum necessary for outbreak investigation and
management.55
b. Monitoring access to patient health records and
procedures for electronic communication with external
laboratories or organizations involved in outbreak
investigation to ensure electronic data transfer is
adequately secured and encrypted.
Laboratory: Laboratory personnel can be particularly
vulnerable during an emerging pathogen outbreak. The
facility must notify and identify personnel who may be
working with samples with transmission risks. Personnel
must follow appropriate laboratory standards. The facility
should train HCP and laboratory personnel in:
a. Appropriate selection and use of PPE, including
donning and dofﬁng procedures.57,58
b. Buddy systems and safety stops to prevent exposures
and encourage safety.
During a potential or identiﬁed emerging pathogen outbreak,
laboratory services should be coordinated within the framework of the CDC Laboratory Response Network (LRN).42
Due to the potential risk for laboratory specimens to be used
in bioterrorism, the facility’s laboratory should ensure
security of specimens’ containment and disposal.56
Mental health/psychology
Occupational health,10 including stafﬁng models with
considerations for:
a. Nonpunitive sick leave
b. Alternative ways to provide care, such as telemedicine, as a strategy to reduce potential HCP
exposures
c. Post-exposure prophylaxis
d. Quarantine
e. Furlough
f. The potential for heat stress and fatigue with the use
of PPE.
Pharmacy
Security: Facility safety and security concerns may arise
during the investigation of an outbreak and the facility
may need to limit or restrict visitation to protect patients
and the public and minimize transmission risks, requiring
collaboration with members of the HIMT and others,
including the following59,60:
a. Facility security and law enforcement agencies
in situations where limitations are placed on patient
and/or visitor movement.61
b. Communications leadership/PIO to maintain a high
level of security when interacting with the media to
preserve the privacy of hospital staff, patients, and their
families.
c. A facility’s EOP should encompass a security risk
assessment of the physical plant and HCP, including the
following:
i. Enactment of enhanced perimeter controls
ii. Restriction of visitation
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iii. Protection of resources (including stockpiled
items) such as PPE, medications, and vaccines62
11. Transport
Facility infrastructure supports include the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Power
Water
Ventilation
Isolation rooms
Quarantine areas
Surge capacity
Morgue capacity
PPE: To limit spread through direct or indirect contact, the
HE may need to initiate transmission-based precautions
depending on the mode of transmission of the implicated
microorganism.50 The EOP should estimate PPE needs and
ensure adequate supply and during an outbreak audit staff
use.63 Microorganisms transmitted through droplets and
aerosols warrant the use of PPE, including masks (droplet
spread) and N95 respirators or powered air purifying
respirators (PAPRs) (aerosol spread). In past outbreaks,
inconsistent use of PPE and lack of attention to proper
dofﬁng techniques was shown to lead to infection.54,64,65 As
part of the preparedness phase, the facility should take the
following steps:
a. Train HCP in donning and dofﬁng techniques
b. Conduct ﬁt testing of frontline HCP for N95
respirators
c. Train and certify HCP in the use of PAPRs, when
appropriate.

Equipment and Supplies for Management of an Emerging
Pathogen Outbreak
Recommendations.
1. As part of the EMP, the facility should undertake the
following measures:
a. Maintain and make easily accessible an inventory of PPE
and medical equipment that identiﬁes what is on hand
and what is needed for speciﬁc categories of emerging
pathogen outbreaks.
b. Designate an individual responsible for maintaining
levels of equipment, managing out-of-date supplies,
and determining a plan to relay critical supply shortages
to the local and state emergency response centers (eg, via
the Logistics Section Chief in HIMT).
c. Identify and coordinate communication channels with
other regional medical centers regarding equipment,
supplies, and capacity for a regional response to an
emerging pathogen.
d. Depending on the nature of the suspected pathogen, when
possible and appropriate, utilize disposable medical
equipment to minimize the need for decontamination.
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Rationale. Using an all hazard self-assessment, the hospital
should identify risks and appropriate combinations of PPE
items based on speciﬁc emerging pathogens, including the
following17,45,66:
1. Respiratory protection (eg, masks, respirators, PAPRs)
2. Eye protection (eg, face shields, goggles)
3. Impervious body coverings (eg, gowns, aprons, leggings,
boots, head coverings)
4. Gloves
These items should be procured and stockpiled. Additional
PPE may be required and designated personnel should ensure
monitoring of supplies and a strategy for accessing PPE in a
situation where quantities are limited.44
The CDC Hospital All Hazard Self-Assessment has a
checklist for maintaining resources for emergency response.17
These include considerations for the following:
1. Use of disposable supplies and equipment over reusable
medical equipment (RME) when managing highly transmissible pathogens. If RME must be used, the facility
should consider having multiple pieces to cohort for known
and/or suspect patients and reserve other equipment to
maintain routine work ﬂow.
2. Pathogen-speciﬁc indications for antivirals and vaccines.28
3. Telemedicine for patient care to reduce the amount of
exposed equipment that requires decontamination, as well
as PPE requirements.
4. Strategies to help maintain routine patient care activities
(eg, using point-of-care testing for isolated patients to keep
potentially highly infectious samples from contaminating
laboratory equipment and allow for normal laboratory
function; autoclave capabilities for medical waste).67
5. The number of ventilators (adult and pediatric) available in
the facility.
6. The capacity of other regional medical centers to coordinate triage of patients when faced with surge events.17
Role of the HE in Experimental Vaccines, Therapeutics, and
Clinical Research during an Emerging Pathogen Outbreak
Recommendations.
1. A facility, depending on its structure and resources, may
engage in work on experimental vaccines, therapeutics, and/
or clinical research during an emerging pathogen outbreak.
If the facility determines it may have a role in these activities,
the facility should identify external partners, resources, and
HCP roles during the preparedness phase and outline them
in the EOP. The HE may assume a leadership role in such
activities or the facility may designate another individual to
assume this role, which may involve the following:
a. Collaboration with external partners, including
HCCs or other state/territorial/regional public health
authorities, industry, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and facility structures such as the

Human Subjects Review Committee (or equivalent),
to identify experimental vaccines or therapeutics that
may be used.
b. Conduct of clinical research, conforming to all applicable regulations.
Rationale. Clinical research during an emerging pathogen
outbreak can advance knowledge and provide potential
countermeasures (medical and/or surgical) for affected individuals. Clinical research conducted during such periods must
adhere to scientiﬁc and ethical standards.68
In an emerging pathogen outbreak, the HE may assume
a role in approved clinical research that meets ethical and
scientiﬁc standards (eg, identifying experimental vaccines
or therapeutics, administration of experimental vaccines
or therapeutics, obtaining clinical samples for analysis, and
conducting chart review). Given the HE’s potential leadership
role in an emerging outbreak response, the HE may consider
delegating clinical research to another qualiﬁed individual
within the facility. This individual may be an infectious disease
physician, infectious disease pharmacist, or other HCP with
appropriate expertise and requisite clinical research experience
and training (eg, Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative
(CITI), Good Clinical Practice).

Role of Infection Prevention Staff and Direct Care HCP
Recommendations.
1. During all phases of incident management, infection
prevention staff should:
a. Collaborate with and support the HE.
b. Continue to perform outbreak surveillance and effectively communicate this information to the HE.
c. Provide knowledge and skills regarding infection
prevention practices.
2. A direct-care HCP should be able to do the following:
a. Recognize that clusters of patients or HCP with
infection, or a single patient or HCP with a very
unusual infection, may represent the start of an
outbreak.
b. Report this to infection prevention and control staff.
c. Continue to perform standard infection prevention and
control measures while awaiting further guidance from
infection prevention and control.
3. The direct-care HCP designated to provide patient care
during an outbreak setting should demonstrate competency
in standard and special protocols to respond to and contain
pathogens within the scope of practice.
Rationale. A facility’s surveillance program must include
protocols for direct care HCP to identify, isolate, and notify
relevant authorities, as front line HCP often notice outbreaks
in very early stages.12,25,41,69 HCP should follow their organization’s policies and procedures. Once a facility or emerging
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pathogen outbreak is identiﬁed, the direct-care HCP should
continue to follow the facility’s infection prevention and control and occupational health and safety policies and procedures, including interim guidance from infection prevention
and facility leadership regarding speciﬁc measures to contain
the outbreak. For certain pathogens, such as EVD, the facility
should ensure additional training to create dedicated teams of
HCP for provision of care within their scope of practice.70
The knowledge and skills required to plan for and respond
to a facility or emerging pathogen outbreak fall within the
infection prevention and control areas of responsibility.41,71
The infection preventionist (IP) applies surveillance deﬁnitions and methodologies and ensures timely communication
with the HE. The core competencies of an IP include infection
prevention and control activities and championing a safety
culture within multidisciplinary incident management teams
and clinical supportive staff.41,71 Infection prevention staff
members are not expected to participate in direct patient care
activities unless those activities are within the scope of their
background and training.42
Special Considerations for Resource-Limited Facilities and
Special Patient Populations
Certain populations and healthcare settings, such as pediatric
patients, resource-limited facilities, and long-term-care
facilities (LTCFs) may have unique challenges in preparing
for and responding to infectious disease outbreaks. Below
are setting and population-speciﬁc recommendations and
resources.
Resource-Limited Facilities
Recommendations.
1. Resource-limited facilities should use an HVA to assess
their capacity to respond to outbreaks, and mitigate deﬁciencies through identiﬁcation and training of local experts,
collaboration with established infection prevention and
control programs, and consultation with HEs.
2. Resource-limited facilities should access local, state/
territorial/regional, and federal EMPs and services when
developing their EMP.
3. Resource-limited facilities should develop JASs that
combine and prioritize HIMT positions according to the
facility’s capabilities and needs.
4. The HE should participate in exercises/drills, which provide
experience in incident management procedures and interaction with facility leaders and staff.
Rationale. Community and critical access hospitals
and other healthcare facilities, such as long-term care
facilities (LTCFs), face unique challenges when approaching
incident management for infectious diseases outbreaks
because of signiﬁcant variability in available resources. During
the preparedness stage, such facilities should conduct
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HVAs/risk assessments to identify gaps, including potential
for decreases in number of personnel due to illness and
limitations due to the facility’s location (eg, rural). Once
resource gaps are identiﬁed, the facility should contact
local hospitals or public health partners to assist in
mitigating gaps.
Facilities can improve response plans though collaboration
with other local facilities,4 partnership with a larger facility or
network of hospitals with established infection prevention and
control policies, and hiring a consultant HE. As resourcelimited facilities may not be equipped to handle all emerging
pathogens, hospitals should work with state and public health
departments to facilitate transfer of patients to the closest
facility in their region with the appropriate level of care.
Effective planning should lead to the preemptive establishment
of emergency assistance agreements, including mutual aid
agreements or memoranda of understanding among community and local facilities.32 Facilities should ensure a detailed
understanding of supports and resources available through
local/county, state/territorial/regional, and federal public
health agencies that can be accessed if outbreak management
resources need to be mobilized in an urgent situation. Assistance also may be available from state/territorial/regional
emergency operations centers and state and federal response
teams within NIMS, the National Disaster Medical System
(NDMS), CDC, HHS biocontainment units, and the National
Response Framework (NRF).13
Facilities should use HICS to manage threats or emergency
incidents, including emerging pathogen outbreaks, and
align their EMP with local EMS, ﬁre and law enforcement,
public and behavioral health facilities, other area or regional
hospitals, and public or private organizations.10 The facility
may need to develop modiﬁcations to HICS speciﬁcally
to address limited resources. For smaller hospitals, most
adaptations require combining job roles of the HIMT using
JAS, which can be modiﬁed to blend positions to better ﬁt
hospitals that have fewer staff to respond in an incident,
recognizing that some positions are more easily combined
than others. Several resources provide instructions and sample
worksheets to effectively combine and prioritize HIMT
positions.6,14,72
Smaller hospitals or nonhospital healthcare facilities may
contract with another facility or a speciﬁc individual to provide
HE services. The HE will likely serve in the role of medicaltechnical specialist within the HICS structure. Community
infectious diseases physicians who will act as medical-technical
specialists to the IC may be challenged by lack of partners
inside and outside the facility. They should prioritize developing relationships with facility staff and decision-makers
inside the facility. This may be accomplished by pairing the HE
with an administrative counterpart who is familiar with the
facility and key personnel. If the HE is contracting with a
facility, he/she should address his/her role in incident management and emergency response and negotiate for ﬁnancial
resources for training and leadership development, as well as
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provisions for remote assistance if the HE normally practices
in other locations. Facilities should consider sending key staff,
including HEs, for educational training to build personnel
knowledge and expertise in outbreak response. The HE should
have access to the facility’s contacts that will provide operational assistance, to include the local health commissioner,
chief of police, sheriff, local emergency management and safety
ofﬁcials the facility’s legal counsel, and state/territorial/regional department of health contacts.
Special Patient Populations
Recommendations.
1. Facilities should be aware that pregnant women and
immunocompromised individuals may have atypical presentations of illness that could lead to delayed diagnosis, or
be at higher risk for severe complications or prolonged
contagiousness, all of which may lead to greater potential
for cross transmission to other patients, HCP, and visitors.
2. The EOP should incorporate special considerations for
pediatric patients:
a. Encouragement of parental/guardian involvement in the
care and support of children, whether in person or
through videoconferencing technology.
b. Safety considerations for parent(s)/guardian(s) to be at
the bedside, including:
i. Whether the parent/guardian already has been
exposed to the pathogen, or is considered immune
(eg, measles).
ii. Whether the facility has the capacity to provide care
for the parent/guardian if he or she becomes ill.
iii. If the parent/guardian has a condition that places
them at increased risk (eg, pregnancy, immunocompromised).
iv. If the parent/guardian can don/doff appropriate PPE
and follow infection prevention and control policies
and procedures.
3. In stafﬁng considerations, the facility should consider the
following:
a. The added daily care and supervision tasks children
require when parent(s)/guardian(s) cannot be involved.
b. The potential for increased liaising with public health
departments in outbreaks involving school children,
university students, childcare centers, and residential
facilities.
Rationale. Outbreaks of infections that disproportionately
affect pregnant women require special resources and
preparedness plans, including coordination with adult and
neonatal intensive care units and labor and delivery HCP.73
Few evidence-based recommendations exist to inform
policies and procedures around parental/guardian presence
during outbreak situations. The American Academy of
Pediatrics issued a clinical report based on experience
during the 2014 EVD Outbreak,74 which reviews options,

including minimizing visitors by utilizing electronic means
of communication (eg, videophone, email) to allow the
patient to interact with a larger sphere of family and friends.
Planning for parental/guardian presence should occur prior
to patient arrival, and should include input from the
ethics committee (or equivalent) and child’s life (or equivalent), in addition to physician, nursing, hospital administration, and infection prevention. Hospital staff must be
aware of parental/guardian anxiety, and encourage frequent communication regarding the child’s clinical condition
and progress.75 If parent(s)/guardian(s) are affected by
the outbreak and hospitalized, videophone communication
can provide an important link to children; however, the
psychological impact to a child of seeing an ailing parent/
guardian should be weighed against the beneﬁt of mutual
support.
Notably, while this section focuses on pediatric patients,
issues regarding family members/visitors at the bedside also
arise for adult patients. The facility should plan for how it will
handle family members and visitors of all patients, including
adults, and include those plans in the EOP.
In an outbreak setting, stafﬁng considerations must
consider the added daily care and supervision tasks children
require.76 As part of facility preparedness, facilities should
consider the number of daily care activities that rely on
parental/guardian presence. Depending on their age, many
children rely on assistance with feeding, bathing, diaper
changing, nose wiping, and other care, even when healthy.
Parent(s)/guardian(s) routinely participate in these activities for
their hospitalized children, and when parent(s)/guardian(s)
are not available to perform these tasks, they fall to the
nursing staff.
Because of the close quarters, dormitory living, and
frequent contacts, outbreaks of contagious pathogens occur in
universities, childcare centers, schools, and residential care
facilities. Ongoing outbreaks at the time of a school break can
lead to widespread expansion as students bring the infection
to their homes and communities. To contain spread, the
facility may need to provide increased communication/liaising
with relevant local and state/territorial/regional health
departments.76
Long-Term-Care Facilities
Recommendations.
1. During preparedness and response to an emerging pathogen outbreak, the acute-care hospital should do the
following:
a. Develop collaborative protocols and conduct preplanning exercises/drills to facilitate interaction.
b. Ensure clear and timely communication with LTCFs
and EMS transport.
2. This document does not provide recommendations for
adapting acute-care policies to other settings, such as longterm-care (LTC) and postacute-care facilities, due to the
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lack of literature on the topic; however, these facilities
should review the resources listed below to help their preparedness and response efforts for infectious diseases
outbreaks.
Rationale . LTCFs are a critical component of the healthcare system. Recent focus on the role of LTCFs in disaster
preparedness and response has led to numerous resources
supporting the integration of these facilities into incident
management efforts:
a. CDC planning resources by setting: long-term, acute,
and chronic care.77
b. The California Association of Health Facilities Disaster
Preparedness Program: resources and tools to assist
LTCFs with disaster planning and provide standardized
methods speciﬁcally intended for LTCFs to respond to
new incidents.78
c. Nursing Home Incident Command System (NHICS):
Appendix I: Resources and References.72
d. HICS for Small Hospitals14: provides guides intended for
small and rural hospitals that also face issues with limited
personnel and other resources. Technical support and
facilitation, from a federal or local partner or the private
sector may improve communication and information
sharing.79
e. Transfer forms
i. CDC Prevention Tool Kits80
ii. Registries used to monitor spread of multidrug-resistant
organisms (MDROs) and improve communication
with interfacility transfer at the state/territorial/regional
levels.81
During an emerging pathogen outbreak, clear, effective, and
timely communication between the acute-care hospital
and LTCF is essential to support infection prevention and
control efforts, assist in antibiotic stewardship, and provide
surveillance in real time.82 Establishing communications
channels between an acute-care hospital and LTCF helps
identify barriers/gaps prior to an outbreak. The infection
prevention and control team at the acute-care hospital should
identify a designated contact person, infection preventionist,
or HE for all transfers to an LTCF.
After stabilization and supportive care in an acute-care
setting is complete, patients with chronic disabilities or rehabilitation needs may be transferred to an LTCF. The extent and
type of information relayed from the facility to the LTCF will
vary depending on the type of outbreak and the resources
needed to prevent transmission and maintain HCP and patient
safety. Transfer of information should occur prior to the
patient arriving in an LTCF so that appropriate accommodation (eg, private room, necessary contact supplies) can be
arranged. Essential information should be transmitted both
verbally (eg, RN/MD to RN/MD/LPN) and either electronically through a dedicated computer system, or through a
standardized form.5,80
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Essential communication components should include, but
are not limited to:
a. Need for isolation
b. Type of isolation (eg, contact, droplet)
c. Duration of isolation, if known
d. Type of infection
e. Immunization status
f. Current symptoms (eg, incontinence of stool, wounds)
g. Need for additional personnel to provide care
h. Devices (eg, central line) information including time of
insertion and plan for management
i. Plan for anti-infective therapy administration and infectious disease follow-up
j. Plan for scheduled monitoring of any predetermined
clinical ﬁnding and/or laboratory values speciﬁc to the
anti-infective therapy and reporting those to the physicians managing the infection
k. Environmental cleaning recommendations
LTCFs should be encouraged to ask questions to have a clear
understanding of all components listed above or any details
regarding a patient’s care prior to transfer.
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hospitals, 2 (4%) children’s hospitals, 2 (4%) nonmilitary
federal hospitals, 2 (4%) acute-care adult and pediatrics, and 1
(2%) of each of the following: rehabilitation, home care tertiary, tertiary, public, teaching, and outpatient surgical. The
hospitals ranged in size from <100 licensed beds to >1,000
licensed beds. Of the 44 hospitals with information available, 2
(5%) have <100 beds, 10 (23%) have 101–300 beds, 14 (32%)
have 301–500 beds, 4 (9%) have 501–700 beds, 5 (11%) have
701–900 beds, 5 (11%) have >1,000 beds.

appendix 1. needs assessment

Incident Command

METHODS

All 49 respondents indicated familiarity with their institution’s
HICS. Twenty-eight (57%) were familiar before the US Ebola
experience and 21 (43%) became familiar during the US Ebola
alert. Respondents were asked what role they serve in the
HICS; of the 48 respondents, 46 (96%) respondents serve as
the medical technical specialist, 3 (6%) as the incident commander, 3 (6%) as the planning chief, and 1 (2%) as the
logistics chief. Forty (82%) hospitals indicated that the emerging infection preparedness infrastructure was incorporated
into the HICS, while 3 (6%) reported that it was not and
6 (12%) did not know.

A needs assessment survey, disseminated online via RealMagnet software (Bethesda, MD), was sent to US SHEA Research
Network (SRN) members in July 2016 with 3 weeks for completion. It included 25 questions regarding hospital policies,
current practices, management of speciﬁc infections and outbreaks, and resources. Basic information about respondents and
hospital afﬁliation was linked in aggregate to survey ﬁndings.
While this survey represented a small sample of diverse US
hospitals, there is likely a bias toward hospitals that prioritize
infection prevention because they are already SRN members
and chose to participate; therefore, it is possible that the
represented hospitals are better trained with more infection
prevention practices in place than other US hospitals.
RESULTS
Of the 87 eligible members (who serve as HEs or infectious
diseases specialists at their institutions), 49 (56%) completed
the survey.
Respondent and Hospital Characteristics
Of the 49 respondents, 43 have the following, nonexclusive primary hospital roles: 37 (86%) epidemiologist, 28 (65%) infection
control committee chair, 26 (60%) patient care, 23 (53%),
teaching/education, 22 (51%) clinical research, 10 (23%) administration, 4 (9%) infection preventionists, 4 (9%) public health,
2 (5%) antibiotic stewardship, 1 (2%) basic research,
1 (2%) clinical microbiology, and 1 (2%) quality and safety chair.
The hospitals represented are diverse. Of the 46 for which
information is available: 27 (59%) academic centers, 8 (17%)
community hospitals with academic afﬁliation, 4 (9%) community nonacademic hospitals, 2 (4%) Veterans Affairs

Staff Responsibilities and Knowledge
Figure 3 displays the frequency of respondents’ infection
prevention-related responsibilities. The survey assessed the
hospital’s clinical and nonclinical staff’s knowledge of CDC
“Ebola Assessment Domains for Infection Prevention and
Management.” For each domain, respondents indicated whether hospital staff relevant to that domain ﬁt into 1 of 4 categories: “need more information,” “somewhat knowledgeable,”
“very knowledgeable,” or “don’t know.”

Outbreak Simulations
Forty-four hospitals (90%) reported the use of simulation
training. Departments and/or groups included were the
emergency department (n = 44; 100%), laboratory management (n = 37; 84%), hospital security (n = 37; 84%), intensive
care unit personnel (n = 36; 82%), and environmental services
(n = 35; 80%). The departments/groups least involved were
outpatient areas (n = 12; 27%), and medical/surgical ward
personnel (n = 13; 30%).
Speciﬁc Emerging Infections
Respondents were asked about 7 infectious diseases and whether speciﬁc policies and procedures exist, are simulated,
implemented, and HICS activated for management and treatment (Table 4). Of 48 responding hospitals, common policies
included 48 Ebola (100%), 44 pandemic inﬂuenza (92%), and
40 CRE (83%). Among hospitals with policies, 43 hospitals
(90%) have simulated Ebola, 28 hospitals (64%) have simulated pandemic inﬂuenza, and 14 (40%) have simulated
MERS-CoV. Twenty-nine (60%) hospitals have activated their
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Emerging infection preparedness responsibilities.

Hospital Policies, Simulations, Suspect/Treated Cases and HICS Activation for Speciﬁc Emerging Infections

Variable
Infection-speciﬁc clinical and operational policies
and procedures are in place
If policies and procedures are in place, they have been
simulated
Hospital has treated suspected or conﬁrmed case(s)
HICS has been activated (eg, single case of suspected
or conﬁrmed Ebola could activate HICS)

No. of
Ebola,
Respondents No. (%)

MERSCoV, No.
(%)

Zika,
No.
(%)

Pandemic
Inﬂuenza,
No. (%)

CRE,
No.
(%)

MDR-TB,
No. (%)

Measles and Vaccine
Preventable Diseases,
No. (%)

48

48 (100)

35 (73)

15 (31)

44 (92)

40 (83)

36 (75)

36 (75)

44

43 (90)

14 (40)

1 (7)

28 (64)

8 (20)

4 (11)

3 (8)

47
29

16 (34)
23 (79)

22 (47)
4 (14)

11 (23)
1 (3)

26 (55)
10 (34)

43 (91)
3 (10)

25 (52)
1 (3)

27 (57)
3 (10)

NOTE. HICS, hospital incident command system; MERS-CoV, Middle East respiratory syndrome-coronavirus; CRE, carbapenem-resistant
Enterobacteriaceae; MDR-TB, multidrug-resistant tuberculosis.

HICS, primarily for Ebola (n = 23; 79%) and pandemic
inﬂuenza (n = 10; 34%). Of these, only 16 hospitals have
treated suspected or conﬁrmed cases of Ebola.
Training
Respondents were asked about information sources for
emerging infections. All respondents utilize CDC guidance.
Other trusted resources include: state and local health
departments (n = 45; 92%), SHEA (n = 40; 82%), the World
Health Organization (n = 40; 82%), and the Infectious Diseases Society of America (n = 38; 78%).
Staff training varies among hospitals. Overall, 36 hospitals
(73%) train staff members during an outbreak or epidemic.
Otherwise, training varies by department (n = 22; 45%), or
occurs annually (n = 22; 45%). Interestingly, infectious diseases education only happens upon hire in 19 hospitals (39%).
The most common types of staff education tools that
respondents requested include clinical vignettes and table top

exercises (n = 39; 80%), checklists (n = 32; 65%), and online
or in-person simulations (n = 31; 63%). Less than half of
respondents requested research articles (n = 6; 12%) and fact
sheets (n = 22; 45%).
Communications
When hospitals communicate infection prevention information to patients and the public, several strategies are used
including written education materials in patient waiting areas
(n = 41; 84%), hospital websites (n = 40; 82%), and as-needed
direct communications between clinical staff and patients
(n = 39; 80%). Email, verbal education in patient waiting
areas, and social media were used by less than half of
responding hospitals.
Of 49 responding hospitals, 45 (92%) reported a communication strategy with state and local health departments. Many
hospitals (n = 39; 80%) have an established communication
procedure with other regional healthcare facilities for serious
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emerging infections. Some hospitals use outside communication facilitators during an outbreak or epidemic including: the
state health department (n = 40; 82%), local health department
(n = 37; 76%), local hospital associations (n = 16; 33%), and
local Association for Professionals in Infection Control and
Epidemiology (APIC) chapter (n = 11; 22%). Of 48 responding
hospitals, 40 (83%) reported a system in place to coordinate
care with other facilities (eg, Ebola Treatment Centers).
Of the 49 responding hospitals, 43 (88%) reported an
established media communication strategy for suspected cases
of serious emerging infections or infection control practices.
Of the 48 responding hospitals, 45 (94%) have trained public
relations staff. Other trained staff include hospital administrators (n = 28; 58%), healthcare epidemiologists (n = 21;
44%), medical directors of infection prevention (n = 16; 33%),
and infectious diseases physicians (n = 8; 17%).
Of the 49 responding hospitals, 15 (31%) have an established group who meet regularly and can rapidly develop a
regional emerging infection response; 21 (43%) hospitals
reported a regional group that did not meet regularly, but
could mobilize quickly.
DISCUSSION
This needs assessment demonstrates the following points:
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1. The US Ebola experience improved hospitals’ familiarity
with HICS and implementation of outbreak simulation and
communication strategies.
2. 57% of respondents were familiar with HICS prior to the
US Ebola experience.
3. Healthcare epidemiologists often serve as the Medical
Technical Specialist during HICS activation for a serious
emerging infection.
4. More than 90% of responding hospitals have treated
suspected/conﬁrmed cases of CRE; >50% of hospitals
have treated suspected/conﬁrmed cases of vaccinepreventable diseases, pandemic inﬂuenza, and tuberculosis. Two-thirds of hospitals activated HICS due to 1 of
these infections.
5. Most hospitals have trained public relations communication staff; <50% of healthcare epidemiologists have
received media training.
6. Three-quarters of hospitals report including support staff
on emerging pathogens and serious infectious diseases
training.
7. Ninety percent of responding hospitals utilize outbreak
simulation, including simulation laboratories, but infrequently include ambulatory and medical/surgical ward staff.
8. Few hospitals provide guidance to postacute-care and
LTCFs during an outbreak or epidemic.
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